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abstract
I present an investigation into themerging of art practice and engineering. The study
is conducted from a ﬁrst-person perspective, in which I attempt to reconcile my en-
gineering and research background with contemporary art. Through the use of an
ongoing methodological dialogue, a comprehensive engagement between art prac-
tice and engineering results, producing a balanced (non-hierarchical) exchange of
ideas. The works of the thesis exhibition blur the distinction between the aesthetic
and the technical as well as the natural and the artiﬁcial, featuring mimetic-motion
cybernetic machines, concept sketches, mathematical derivations, and an array of
“workplinths.” Sited in an industrial complex, the installation is itself a gesture of
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If the chain is interrupted at any point, it ceases to transport truth— ceases,
that is, to produce, to construct, to trace and to conduct it. The word “ref-
erence” designates the quality of the chain in its entirety ... Truth-value
circulates here like electricity through a wire, so long as this circuit is not
interrupted.




TûüĆ ćûøĆüĆ ăąĂăĂĆøĆ a hybrid practice based on a merging of art and engineer-ing. These disciplines are placed in conversation, producing a dialogue which
is at the core of my investigation. This dialogue is intimate in nature, with art and
engineering accompanying each other throughout the process of making work, from
the broadest conceptualization of a project to the minute details of fabricating parts.
In a literal sense, I am testing the hypothesis put forward by philosopher Barry Allen,
that “it is only when technology is practiced as art— when it is free to be practiced
as art— that it can do its best work” (Allen, 2008, p. 6). At the same time, I am test-
ing how engineering can inﬂuence artistic production by deepening the interaction
with the medium of technology. In a society (or, as philosopher Bruno Latour would
clarify, a collective¹) described by Allen as “ineluctably technological,”² a responsive
art practice needs a comprehensive engagement with engineering, science andmath-
ematics. And while there is a signiﬁcant history of various deliberate interweavings
¹Latour deﬁnes collective as a group of interconnected human and non-human actants; the distinc-
tion between society and collective is relevant here since in order to confront the technological in
art I employ a close examination of the interaction between human (user or viewer) and non-human
(tool or machine). As discussed in the text, the ontologies of user and tool are not pre-determined,
but emerge from interaction.
²(Allen, 2008, p. 182)
of art and technology³, what helps to distinguish this investigation is its ﬁrst-person
perspective. I work as both artist and engineer. I am an experienced engineering
researcher-practitioner undertaking an intensive interdisciplinary program of gradu-
ate study in ﬁne art. But why should we concern ourselves with the interplay of art
and engineering, in the ﬁrst place? Put another way, how well are collectives served
by keeping the technical and the aesthetic in separate bins? Allen deﬁnes technolog-
ical as “a steep rise in the scope and intensity of technical mediation, meaning ma-
chines that interface with other machines as much or more than with humans.” He
describes a system of ubiquitous blackboxing and overwhelming complexity made
less evident through abstraction and specialization (Allen, 2008, p. 109). While this
machinic dark matter pervades our lives, it has remained largely outside of contem-
porary art discourse. As art historian and critic Claire Bishop notes:
So why do I have a sense that the appearance and content of contemporary
art have been curiously unresponsive to the total upheaval in our labor and
leisure inaugurated by the digital revolution? While many artists use digi-
tal technology, how many really confront the question of what it means to
think, see, and ﬁlter affect through the digital? How many thematize this,
or reﬂect deeply on how we experience, and are altered by, the digitization
of our existence? (Bishop, 2012)
Bishop seems to be suggesting the need for a broadening of scope, and possibly,
the integration of new media within the contemporary art canon. The mechanisms
underlying the split between new media and contemporary art have been recently
³In the Renaissance, such an interweaving was seamless since there were no disciplinary bound-
aries as we have today. More recently, since the latter half of the twentieth century, there have been,
for example, various early attempts at combining computer graphics and art (Dietrich, 1986). In the
1960s and 1970s, Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) was a concerted effort at integration, founded
by artists Robert Rauschenberg and Robert Whitman and engineers Billy Klüver and Fred Waldhauer
(Klüver and Rauschenberg, 1998). EAT looked at technology critically and attempted to show the limits
of our abilities to solve problems with engineering and science (Kuo, 2011). Modernist technocratic
fervor reached a zenith by 1970 and rapidly waned as environmental and sociological concerns inten-
siﬁed (particularly over the ramiﬁcations of the Vietnam War, nuclear proliferation and pollution).
EAT was largely dissolved by 1974.
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described by art historian Edward Shanken, in the introduction of a special issue de-
voted to this divide (Shanken, 2011). Historically, new media has existed beyond the
periphery of mainstream gallery culture, partly because of its non-traditional forms.
Exposed wiring, electronics and pneumatics, are a distraction to the aesthetic experi-
ence. But what is germane to aesthetics? Certainly, conceptual art has done the work
of shifting judgment from how an object merely appears to what the object implies
beyond traditional aesthetic essentialism. Under consideration here is the object’s
functioning and design as a possible reframing of the conceptual apparatus. For this
fusion of the artistic and the technological to take shape fully, a new aesthetic ap-
proach to technological production is needed. By contending with what Allen calls
the “engineer’s art ... of composition, combination, integration, systems, design,” my
aim is to discover parallels between art practice and engineering, developing insights
into how art may further engage with the technological (Allen, 2008, p. 109).
Even in newmedia art, the role of technology has been more about special effects
than inner workings. But technology is itself loaded with signiﬁers of our networked
reality, with interacting electronic and mechanical components reﬂecting the inter-
play of aesthetics, function, militarism, labour and politics. These obscure associa-
tions encoded within technology are becoming more evident the more technology
permeates contemporary life. Human beings who have grown up with computers
and the Internet are developing an intuitive understanding of programming, digi-
tal communications and cybernetic interventions. Because of its pervasiveness and
impacts, technology has become the primary medium of human expression and in-
teraction, as relevant as paint or clay have been at any point in our history. And, in
analogy with painting or sculpture, new media will develop systems of knowledge
and rigorous approaches to its underlying technics within the context of artistic pro-
duction. It is in this direction of developing themediumof technology itself inwhich
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this work strives to contribute.
Developing an aesthetic awareness within technological production has implica-
tions beyond the white cube. Technical mediation concerns how and to what extent
we rely on machinery, and in our current situation, this reliance is substantial and
increasing exponentially. Is this good or bad? While the quality of a work of art (or
design or engineering) can be assessed by using variousmetrics, Allen emphasizes the
human experience. He deﬁnes the beauty of a work as the extent to which the work
embodies the anticipation of the viewer’s (or user’s) perception (Allen, 2008, p. 3). He
suggests that technology ought to be developed with the aesthetic sensitivity of art,
and, therefore, like an artist, an engineer must possess an expansive empathy not
limited by narrow functional, spatial, or temporal parameters. For engineering prac-
titioners to possess such an awareness is critical since, as recent examples demon-
strate, an incrementally greater dependence on technology can produce a dispropor-
tionately large yield. For example, semi-autonomous drone technology, the result of
combining existing aeronautical engineering knowledge with well-understood prin-
ciples of teleoperation, comprises a new capacity to conduct large-scale killings with
impunity (Byman, 2009). Or, consider the social-media-enabled obliteration of civil-
ian dwellings, the gruesome combination of text messaging services and established
laser-guided bombing technologies, representing a juxtaposition of what brings us
together with what tears us apart (Blair, 2014). What are the engineers⁴ in these con-
texts not thinking about?
The apparent division between the aesthetic and the technical is of principal con-
cern here, a distinction which I hope to help to dismantle. It is the aim of the
⁴Even if we do not hold the military engineers of such projects responsible, what about the engi-
neers behind the social media technologies or the equipment manufacturers who indirectly facilitate
these outcomes? Are such uses of their work not anticipated in their imaginings? Where technology
development is concerned, the layers of blackboxes can lead to an atmosphere of passing the buck,
in which no one takes responsibility because, of course, no one possibly can.
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artworks in this thesis to confront the viewer with the physics and metaphysics
surrounding the interactions of tool, user and producer. The tools we use are not
merely implements which are subordinated to us. What we are is determined by
the interaction. Invoking what physicist-philosopher Karen Barad has termed intra-
action (Barad, 2007), user and tool are ontologically indeterminate before an encounter,
i.e., we become through technology. Should we not deliberate more about our own
cyborg conﬁgurations? Of ourmany possible chimerical forms, whywould we prefer





Since the Paleolithic Era, humans and technology have been in a state of co-evolution.
We have, for approximately two million years, been dependent on the use of lever-
aging mechanisms that expand the capabilities inherent to our bodies and cognitive-
exteriorizing implements (from stone tablets to digital storage equipment) that aug-
ment our mental faculties (Allen, 2008; Heidegger, 1977; Mitchell and Hansen, 2012).
It is important to distinguish that for much of our association with technology, tools
and machines have had much more signiﬁcance than mere task facilitation— they
have structured societies as units in ﬂedgling economies (wherein materials, knowl-
edge and the tools themselves are exchanged) and as instruments of change, in which
they have even stimulated abstract thought and the formation of language (Uomini
and Meyer, 2013). So while the speciﬁc conﬁgurations and implementations of tools
have developed vastly over time, their substantial agency in the cultural evolution
of humans is unquestioned.
While the human species has always led a technically mediated existence, where
does the tool end and the human begin? Because the tool propositions the user,
the dynamic interaction between human and technology describes a negotiation,
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an entanglement of agencies (Latour, 1999). As the encounter evolves, user and tool
transition through various paired states of being. For example, consider the case
of a human presented with a gun. The user and tool may ﬁnd themselves assum-
ing the respective roles of passive observer and mechanism followed by participant
and facilitator followed by shooter and accomplice.¹ As cybernetic machinery increas-
ingly inﬂuences or supplants human cognition, appearing in almost every aspect of
contemporary life, from communications, healthcare, recreation, transportation and
governance, what happens to us? If sapiens is characterized by its supreme capacity
to solve problems, then there is irony in human ingenuity applied toward the cre-
ation of machines that reduce the need to think. We had expected that automated
processes and dexterous manipulators would replace us in various so-called menial
capacities, allowing more and more humans to pursue meaningful endeavours. But
in spite of hopes for more free time and enjoyment of life since the emergence of
the Information Age in the late twentieth century, human labour, whether on the
assembly line or in the cubicle, has been corralled as never before into mechanistic
modes of functioning.
Latour describes actor-network theory (ANT) as a method of inquiry, opposed to
a set of rigid sociological models, for uncovering the hidden connections amongst
entities (Latour, 2005). Taking things at face value, we may assume that an object is
deﬁned solely by its physical properties: dimensions, mass, aerodynamic coefﬁcient,
etc. What is more relevant within the collective— the network consisting of the hu-
mans and non-humans activated by the presence of the object (what sociologists
would refer to as the local picture of “society”)— is the inﬂuence of the object on its
neighbours, its capacity for agency when mediating the ﬂows of other actants. For
¹Indeed, do guns kill people or do people kill people? For an in-depth look at this long-standing
gun control topic, see Latour (1999, Chapter 8).
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ANT, no thing—human or not— is an island andwhat things are depends on context.
We abandon preconceived notions of societal structure and the use of “templates”
to describe actants. Every collective is afforded the opportunity to relate a unique
story.
While ANT provides a paradigm shift for studying social groups, it offers only a
handful of methodological guidelines (Latour, 2005). It is akin to anthropological
ﬁeld work, requiring the intense scrutiny of actors and an appreciation for the re-
ﬂexive role played by the observer. Controversies assist in the stimulation of the
network, activating links and eliciting modes of behaviour which would otherwise
go undetected. As a self-described positivist², Latour is clear about the scientiﬁc sym-
pathies of ANT, where observation, modeling and mathematical techniques become
amenable to ordinarily non-quantitative studies associated with the liberal arts. La-
tour has cited Tomás Saraceno’s installation, 14 Billion, whose webs of thousands of
elastic cords are sufﬁciently dense to suggest a fabric, that is, a discrete topology
which is nevertheless capable of describing what we perceive as a continuum, zones
of entangled and nuanced reality (Latour, Feb. 2010). Indeed, this work captures in
three dimensions the myriad relationships in a given collective, those which are usu-
ally invisible and unnoticed. The network must be unraveled through inquiry— by
asking how things come to be— by tracing the impulses traveling along paths now il-
luminated by a distant but connected stimulus. However, while Saraceno reveals the
network, the view is largely static (unless one is permitted to disturb the installation),
belying the dynamism of real life.
The technical milieu in which we now ﬁnd ourselves obscures the distinction
between the natural and the artiﬁcial, a blurring that philosopher Donna Haraway
²“I am, in the end, a naive realist, a positivist.”(Latour, 2005, p. 155).
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describes as the fourth wound to human ontological narcissism³ (Haraway, 2003a).
While the future envisioned by Haraway in A Cyborg Manifesto accurately describes
our current reality, how deeply has mainstream art confronted life in the hyper-
technological collective (Haraway, 1991, Chapter 8)? Such a question seems quaint
in these days of rampant early adoption. However, in regards to technical media-
tion, the stakes are high and matters are becoming increasingly complicated. Har-
away’s cyborg shares much in common with Latour’s actants, in that its ontology
is context-dependent; in fact, through its various afﬁnities, the cyborg deﬁes a pre-
cise ontology. It can be seen as the exception to the rule, a violation of categories
and dualisms, straddling the boundaries of territories. In our grappling with reality,
we construct representations, forming categories and dichotomies in the process.
Cyborgs are themselves constructs which, occupying interstices and defying catego-
rization, undo all of that representational effort. In this ironic sense, cyborgs are a
glimmer of reality thwarting our attempts to understand reality through structure or
representation.⁴
Philosopher Judith Butler proposed what she termed performativity, as a way to
describe how a subject comes to be. In performativity, the ontology of a subject
is dictated largely by iterative enactment. The subject becomes what it is (know-
ingly or not) principally through a process which reinforces an identity (Butler, 1993).
³The ﬁrst wound being the Copernican revolution, or the heliocentric model of the universe re-
placing the geocentric view; the second wound being Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, displacing the
human from the centre of creation; the third wound being the Freudian tripartite structure of the
human psyche, decentering consciousness from a whole, individual agency; the fourth wound being
the realization that there is no separating humans and their “artiﬁcial” creations from the “natural”
world, made especially clear through the ecological impacts of human technological advancements
(Haraway, 2003a).
⁴The cyborg is not entirely a victim, it simply contends with its collective. Haraway has recently
moved on from cyborgs to companion species, in which she presents more of an embracing of circum-
stances, a coming to terms or blending with one’s context than suggested by cyborgs Haraway (2003b).
But the cyborg itself is a mediated being in which the natural and organic ﬁnd companionship with
the artiﬁcial and technological. I prefer the darker implications of cyborgs to the furry, wet-nosed
appeal of canines, but only slightly.
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This insight helped to dismantle the structuralist notion of identity, linking ontol-
ogy inexorably to context. Physicist-philosopher Karen Barad, recognizing the par-
allels between Butler’s ideas and quantum mechanics, has broadened the scope of
performativity beyond its original gender-oriented focus. Using the analogy of the
scientiﬁc apparatus, she contends that both ontological and epistemological limits
are determined by the nature of the experiment (context or network)— is the electron
a particle or a wave?⁵ Barad has developed a new philosophical branch in the process,
an interdisciplinary tour de force known as agential realism (Barad, 2007). In agen-
tial realism, subjects and objects have no a priori essences. They are deﬁned through
interaction, whether the context concerns quantum mechanics or technical media-
tion (Barad, 2007; Latour, 1999, 2005). The ontological implications of technology are
ampliﬁed through iterated, i.e., performative, technical mediation.
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous contemporary smartphone, which outwardly
appears innocuous enough. It is, after all, small, and we give no thought to the fact
that contained within this diminutive package is a computer more powerful than
any building-sized mainframe system used in World War II and during NASA’s moon
missions. But rather than breaking enemy codes and computing trajectories, this
powerful device is now deployed within a ruthless, economic (although sometimes
literal) war between governments or corporate entities, which include espionagemis-
sions to inﬁltrate our electronic lives. How are we participating in these conﬂicts,
⁵It can be either depending on the context— a quantum-mechanical insight which shook the repre-
sentational/structural foundations of physics. Although Barad employs quantum-physics analogies to
disrupt representational conventions, deterministic nonlinear dynamics (themathematics underlying
system theory) also works, but is not as connected with Bohr’s ideas. While quantum effects require
substantial measurement sensitivity to detect at macroscopic scales, deterministic chaos, too, is a
phenomenon associated with precision; it is only because of ﬁnite precision (possibly compounded
by minute quantum effects) in practice that chaotic systems evade prediction, i.e., as with quantum
mechanical systems, deterministic nonlinear dynamic systems exhibit similar epistemological limits.
Also, we don’t need quantum effects to realize ontological indeterminacies, as this is evident in the
couplings of electrical circuit components and in non-trivial multi-body interactions.
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by allowing the smartphone to mediate our activities?
Technical mediation is about affordances and the disruption of identity. The on-
tologies of users and tools dynamically change, momentarily converging to some
transient state of being, throughmutual (bilateral) couplings. Latour talks of humans
and non-humans “folding ... into each other”, describing the ﬂuctuations induced by
various means, owing to technical mediation (Latour, 1999, p. 176). The performa-
tive turn in philosophy responds to structural or representational tendencies, which
have, for science, formed the foundation since the seventeenth century. By deﬁning
subjects and objects with sufﬁcient accuracy, it had been thought, the outcome of
any interaction could be predicted.⁶ Since even “simple” systems comprised of three
actants can defy prediction, what can we determine regarding systems comprised
of several users, their tools and the multitudes of actants hidden in underlying net-
works supporting the interaction? It should not be surprising when such systems
deviate from expected behaviours, producing seemingly emergent phenomena, and
altering our perceptions of what things are.
We understand that our experiences are usually technically mediated, but in our
technological collectives the sheer complexity of the network obscures the full rami-
ﬁcations of our interactions with machines. In addition, the connotation ofmachine
also has indeterminacy: what is the function of a machine? What problem does the
machine solve, when viewed beyond a narrow pre-deﬁned scope, considered within
a broader network which includes other machines, an ecology, ﬂesh and blood? On
the one hand, a machine is amenable to a positivist account by science and engi-
⁶We don’t need the stochastic framework of quantum physics to disprove this. It has been discov-
ered relatively recently that chaotic (unpredictable, though not random) behaviour can be produced
by deterministic nonlinear dynamic systems of only third order. Nevertheless, we are still caught up
in thinking in terms of objects, neatly deﬁned by physical parameters alone, encapsulated by their
faces and edges. And we still assume that each of these black boxes is, as Latour writes, “a matter of
fact that is settled” (Latour, 1999, p. 304).
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neering; the machine is a dynamic system, an interconnection of parts whose way of
working can be deﬁned with precision, e.g., as a set of equations or programs. On the
other hand, the machine is an object of philosophical discourse deﬁned as “a system
of interruptions or breaks (coupures),” which describes production and ﬂow (Deleuze
and Guattari, 2004, p. 38). For philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, once
a machine is discovered, “what can it be used for?” An automobile is a machine, but
so is the coupling of automobile and driver, or the collection of automobile, driver,
ancient organisms and energy policy. Furthermore, through a process described by
Deleuze and Guattari, a painting can be seen as an abstract machine, an apparatus
through which subjects and objects are made (Zepke, 2005). In this manner, the
machine integrates aesthetics and function, bringing into question whether the ma-
chine realizes a pre-determined purpose, or is deﬁned performatively within a given
context. A machine is a network of elements as well as a dynamic system, evolving in
time as the nodes interact with one another along the links coupling them. When a
subject views a painting, the experience can be described by what Deleuze and Guat-
tari call subjectivation, in which, through problematic affect, the ﬁnite— the work
itself— becomes the inﬁnite: the set of all possible variations of cascading thoughts
and experiences through which subjects are deﬁned (Zepke, 2005; Deleuze and Guat-
tari, 2004). In the engineering discipline of systems identiﬁcation, the characteristics
of a dynamic system can only be identiﬁed through a sufﬁciently rich excitation, a
stimulus capable of exciting all possible modes of a network. Indeed, art functions.
What is the function of a painting? A painting can be seen as a machine through
which we discover ourselves.
Linking ANT with system theory (one branch of cybernetics) is a logical fusion,
in which ANT determines the parameters of the collective, and system theory dis-
covers a number of behavioural scenarios (based on initial conditions, external in-
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puts, and disturbances). Cybernetics thus potentially provides ANT with a degree
of predictive capacity, a means of quantitatively characterizing networks. In addi-
tion, there is considerable interpretative freedom for the development of machine-
networks as analogues for social actor-networks with the potential to reveal insights
into our ontological status within techno-scientiﬁc imbroglios. Cybernetics⁷ is it-
self a hybrid discipline comprised of concepts from neuroscience, mathematics and
physics. Mathematician and philosopher Norbert Wiener, a founder of the ﬁeld, has
deﬁned cybernetics as the study of “control and communication in the animal and
the machine” (Wiener, 1961). If one assumes perfect communication (or a complete
understanding of the couplings) between parts or actants, then cybernetics reduces
to system theory, which is one of my primary areas of focus within engineering.
System theory offers both tools for analysis (to predict system behaviour) and syn-
thesis (to design system behaviour). Haraway was quick to pick up on the ominous
overtones of the latter capacity, envisioning a technological future of exploitation
through cybernetic engineering of various societal controls, leading to the Informat-
ics of Domination (Haraway, 1991, Chapter 8). In this thesis, I am re-appropriating
Haraway’s ironic appropriation of cybernetics for the purposes of artistic produc-
tion. Not a reversal, mind you, since, after all, the jury is still out. What becomes
of humans as we depend more and more on cybernetic interventions, those which
replace our own cognition, in increasingly substantial ways? For example, if my car
not only shifts its own gears but navigates on its own, are there mental capacities
which will atrophy from disuse? Certainly, with increasing convenience we might
⁷The preﬁx “cyber” stems from Greek words associated with steering, piloting and governance,
referencing control. The term “cyborg” is a contraction of the phrase cybernetic organism. In modern
usage, the phrase cyber is associated with all things Internet-related, but this conﬂation of “cyber”
and “digital” reﬂects the rise of the digital Turing/von Neumann machine as the dominant computing
paradigm since the Second World War. Cybernetics concerns dynamical systems, and is amenable to
either digital or analog forms of computing.
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expect that the inclination to understand a machine (now layered with even more
complexity) with which I have an intimate connection recedes. For many, the daily
drivemay constitute a primary stimulation of hand-eye coordination, potentially use-
ful (perhaps even critical for survival) in other contexts. And while it can be argued
that such conveniences free us up for other “more relevant” pursuits than dealing
directly with technology, I have to ask, what is more relevant than being technical?
The crux of Allen’s argument is, after all, that being human means being technical.
Are we outmoding ourselves through our own ingenuity?
The commodifying inﬂuence ofmodern technological production extends beyond
the manufactured devices themselves, affecting the associated tools, methods and
developers. The corporate engineer has become a commodiﬁed worker, possessing
knowledge and a way of thinking that is standardized and largely indistinguishable
amongst peers across many institutions.⁸ The immateriality of knowledge labour
has become increasingly blatant over the past two decades. Cultural theorist Tiziana
Terranova writes:
... the “informatics of domination” that Haraway describes in the “Mani-
festo” is certainly preoccupied with the relation between cybernetics, labor,
and capital. In the ﬁfteen years since its publication, this triangulation has
become evenmore evident. The expansion of the Internet has given ideologi-
cal andmaterial support to contemporary trends toward increased ﬂexibility
of the workforce, continuous reskilling, freelance work, and the diffusion of
practices such as “supplementing” (bringing supplementary work home from
the conventional ofﬁce). (Terranova, 2000)
⁸The needs of industry often inﬂuence curricula in educational institutions at all levels, effectively
limiting the scope of programs, tailoring knowledge to facilitate production and generating virtually
undifferentiated graduates; most engineering curricula, for example, provide few elective choices,
with few provisions for liberal arts credits, which I have experienced ﬁrsthand as both an engineer-
ing student as well as a faculty member on curriculum planning committees. One has to go no farther
than to examine the accreditation body ABET (http://www.abet.org/) which determines curriculum re-
quirements for engineering and science programs in the United States (and a handful of nations in
the Middle East and Asia); it is a non-governmental body which assesses public institutions. How
ephemeral is knowledge in science and engineering if ABET deems it necessary to update its accredi-
tation criteria annually?
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Craft (or techne) has always been of central signiﬁcance in art, even when repudi-
ated. A Renaissance painting had a thick description, which included the acquisition
of raw materials⁹, the painstaking preparation of surface and pigments, the develop-
ment of binders as well as the burnishing of gold leaf (The J. Paul Getty Museum,
2014). The artist’s studio was also a laboratory, where aesthetic considerations in-
formed not only a work’s composing, but its composition. And, although invisible,
the process— consisting of a multitude of painstaking steps— contributed to the
work’s affect and value. It was important that the ultra-marine was exotic and ex-
pensive, and that the studio had its own secret recipes for paints. Fast-forward to the
art of the twentieth century, and we see a conspicuous disavowal of labour-intensive
making. The ascendency of mass manufacturing was challenged with ironic uses of
prefabricated elements in the avant-garde and in pop art. At this point, more than
one hundred years after the creation of Duchamp’s ﬁrst readymade, Bicycle Wheel,
the irony has perhaps run its course, and we are now faced with the consequences
of industrialization: globalization and anthropogenic climate change. More recently
the commodiﬁcation of labour and the devaluing of craft have been addressed in the
process and performance works of the 1960s and 1970s entrenched in the feminist
movement. Employing undervalued handicraft or menialized labour, artists such as
Eva Hesse, Jackie Winsor, and Mierle Laderman Ukeles greatly expanded the scope
of the white cube, confronting institutional practices as well as gender and labour
relations. The conspicuity of these works lies in their performative aspects (whether
or not conducted in real-time), subordinating the actual output (art object) to pro-
cess (Jones, 2014). Artists such as Francis Alÿs and Paul Donald are contemporary
exponents of this school, introducing themes of globalization and its impact on art
⁹For example, the quarrying and importing of lapis lazuli from Afghanistan into Italy and Northern
Europe in the fourteenth century.
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practice as well as trade labour— the physical act of working has become emblematic
of humans lockedwithin a hegemonic systemof extraction, production and disposal,
approaching its limits.
2.1 summary of research questions
1. Within a given human-technological collective, of our many possible chimeri-
cal forms, why would we prefer one over another? How do we go about our
choices and appropriations? Why don’t we deliberate more about our own
cyborg conﬁgurations?
2. Are “how” questions and the foregrounding of technical labour valid within
contemporary art?¹⁰
3. How can an engineered system be presented to the viewer in a manner which
is accessible as art and which conveys a sense of complexity and interconnect-
edness (for full engagement in the intended discourses), which may be subtle
and embedded within technics?
4. What are the precedents which could anchor the prosaic activities of technol-
ogy developmentwithin the art canon? What could the engineer do differently
to fashion artworks rather than infrastructural works?
5. How does this hybrid practice inform both art and engineering? What can art
practice and engineering learn from each other?
6. If describing technology as “advanced,” “improved” or“beneﬁtting” is problem-
atic, can “sustainable” or “balanced” technologies be more in harmony with
contemporary thought (postmodernism, metamodernism, etc.)?
¹⁰Especially if there is no single “correct answer.”
17
7. If networks of systems provide a means to gain a broader understanding of
technological impacts, can we identify ﬁxed equilibria to strive toward, or is
technological progress in the broadest conceivable sense an impossibility?
2.2 objectives
1. The creation of compelling body of art which causes the viewer to question
human relationships with technology and the consequences of living within
a large network of black boxes;
2. The development of a hybrid practice, bringing together engineering and practice-
led methodologies, the aims of which include:
(a) opening a sub-genre within newmedia art with a concern for knowledge
labour and the inﬂuence of the Culture Industry on technology develop-
ment and production;




I base my notions of engineering and ﬁne art practice on what I gather from study
and direct experience of these disciplines in academic and professional settings. In
undertaking this thesis, I have often experienced an entanglement of practices, a si-
multaneity of art and engineering. So from the practitioner’s standpoint, there really
is no distinguishing disciplines, in the ﬁrst place. Nevertheless, we must acknowl-
edge an extant division between these ﬁelds as reﬂected in contemporary educa-
tional systems and professional practice, a de facto dichotomy within which we are
always already.
By “engineering” I refer to the use of science or mathematics in the formulating
and solving of a problem through the design and construction of a system or tool¹,
the means by which technologies are produced. Engineering is the process, not the
outcome, and, accordingly, subordinates material to the conceptual; what is techno-
logically feasible is constrained by material limits, but even materials (or pressure-
and temperature-regulating systems) can be invented. In its privileging of concepts,
¹Please see Allen (2008) for a comprehensive anthropological characterization. Brieﬂy, a tool is not
simply a makeshift implement (e.g., a found rock or twig), but an object realized through a sophisti-
cated economy which includes the exchange of ideas, networks of distribution, and sites of material
acquisition.
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modern engineering shares much with the avant-garde, but departs somewhat from
contemporary art practice. Because it is steeped in scientiﬁc knowledge, engineering
makes substantial use of representation², building models of some aspect of reality
but not dealing directly with reality in its fullness until later stages of the implemen-
tation. Unlike idealized, hypothesis-driven science, there is no unique solution in
engineering, but an inﬁnitude of possible results, a fact about which engineers can
sometimes lose sight.
By “art practice” I refer to the application of material and discursive understand-
ing to the creation of objects or experiences through a reﬂexive and ludic process,
optionally accepting and contending with unanticipated results or “failures” as part
of a project (Philpott, 2007; Petelin, 2010-2011; Daniels and Schmidt, 2008; Alvesson
and Skoldberg, 2000). Whereas engineers are often isolated within their cubicles,
artists readily engage with the world around them, synthesizing interactions, global
and local events, formal and informal investigations, as well as personal experience
into work; a gallery opening or art show serves as a nexus conducive to the exchange
of ideas and the stimulation of one’s practice (Breitz, 2013). Contemporary art is sen-
sitive tomaterials, and, much like the continental philosophy informing its leanings,
often views representation with suspicion, and attempts to deal with reality without
mediation. The Western artworld is concerned with audience; artworks are made to
be viewed by the public. In engineering, accessibility is not a priority, although doc-
umentation is always helpful. I have noticed that artists, like engineers, are contin-
²Throughout the thesis, I distinguish between abstraction and representation; I use a version of the
latter term found in science and technology studies (Latour, 1999). The distinction is partly a matter
of degree, but also of emphasis. Abstraction is the use of symbols or signiﬁers, a means often put to
use by artists. Representation is abstraction with the imposition of structures or models dictating the
interactions of symbols, a step beyond abstraction which artists may be reluctant to employ because
of its prescriptive overtones. In this thesis, the structures are developed from scientiﬁc theories or
mathematical formalisms, but may be conjectured or synthesized (in what might be called artistic
license) in order to achieve certain aims. Attending representation is often a subordination ofmaterial
to structure, a view that while materials are interchangeable, structure is not.
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ually solving problems, but unlike contemporary engineers, do not exhibit as much
obsessiveness with narrowly-deﬁned notions of uniqueness and optimality. In art,
singular interpretations are considered cliché or merely illustrative— there cannot
be a unique solution (Shannon, 2013; Shea, 2013).
Engineering is often practiced as a goal-oriented discipline, somewhat like design,
concerned with solutions, but more rigidly attached to supposed unique and opti-
mal outcomes. A desire for the one “correct answer” is, I believe, inherited from a
long association with science, which engineering has long sought to emulate as a
university-level discipline. Although science seems often concerned with discover-
ing the simple truths to explain the universe, we are seeing evidence from cosmol-
ogy, quantummechanics and biology that simple explanations of phenomena are, at
least part of the time, either elusive or non-existent; it is, after all, presumptuously
anthropocentric to believe that the universe is totally amenable to conscious human
understanding (Bogost, 2012). The reality is that engineering shares at least as much
with art as it does science. There is no one solution for an engineering problem, no
single truth to explain why a given design must be right. There is also a craft, an intu-
itive aspect to engineering problem solving, rarely experienced in training. Within
engineering, and also within the hybrid practice under development here, there is
a need to embrace craft and to ﬁnd an equilibrium between intuitive and analytic
ways of working.
Artist and researcher Rachel Philpott explains a process which aims to balance the
freeplay of the mind with “serious” thinking which, while necessary to sift through
the mind’s creative output, often interferes with the development of original ideas
(Philpott, 2007). She ﬁnds that successful ways of working necessitate an oscillation
between analytic and divergent ways of thinking, what she terms ludic methodology.
This approach seems natural for artists, who may often supplement creative studio
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timewith journaling and reﬂection (Petelin, 2010-2011), but for engineers, a conscious
effort is likely necessary to allow the imagination an opportunity to manifest inven-
tive thoughts. Part of what gets in the way, I have found, is a reluctance or fear of
straying too far from the representational tendencies which give engineering much
of its “power.”
Despite its indispensable status in engineering, representation is an obstruction
to interdisciplinarity, making it difﬁcult to be hands-on or solely empirical in one’s
approach. One does not dabble in science or engineering. One is required to op-
erate through, and even pay homage to, representational conventions. But looking
back, we might posit that ﬁne art and engineering are not such distinct territories
in the ﬁrst place. During the Renaissance, the activities of what nowadays would
be known by the disciplines of architecture, engineering, geometry, painting, sci-
ence and sculpture, were intertwined and often conducted by a single individual, the
polymath. Epistemological divisions would have seemed arbitrary (King, 2000). The
talents of individuals like Brunelleschi and Da Vinci notwithstanding, the freeplay
of ideas in the Renaissance was greatly facilitated by a unifying empirical approach³.
Therefore, structures, like sculptures, were built from intuition informed by experi-
ence. Developments in mathematics, philosophy and physics by Descartes, Kant and
Newton among others, laid the seeds of the representational tradition. No longer are
we dealing directly with a falling object, but rather an idealized point mass m at a
displacement x from an origin (“the ground”) accelerating under gravity (idealized as
³The development of linear perspective by Brunelleschi occurred through his scientiﬁc, architec-
tural and geometric exploration of ancient ruins. For the construction of the Dome of Florence
Cathedral, Brunelleschi devised a number of machines, including the Great Hoist, used for the ver-
tical transport of heavy loads. He was proﬁcient not only in structural engineering, but in mechanical
engineering as well, and he possessed none of the mathematical/representational tools of modern
engineers. Da Vinci integrated his engineering prowess into his paintings, constructing ﬁgures from
the inside-out, skeleton to ﬂesh to skin, informed by his ﬁrsthand experience in the dissection of
cadavers; he, too, lacked any sophisticated mathematical tools, but relied substantially on his skills
of observation (Vasari, 2005).
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a constant, g = 9:81 m/s2). We represent the world with a diagram and mathemat-
ics, instantiating a domain of predictive capability. Who can argue with being able
to know what will happen, being able to guarantee⁴ that a structure won’t collapse
or knowing that a machine will function as intended? Since Newton, there has been
an epistemological divergence of ﬁelds which were integrated under a Renaissance
way of thinking. The shift is profound because it introduces a dichotomy. Whereas
in the Renaissance, knowledge was knowledge, we now have a distinction: on the
one hand, propositional knowledge (true and false statements) and intuitive knowl-
edge (know-how or craft) (Allen, 2008). The former, equipped with an idealization
of reality in the form of mathematical representation, provides us with the prospect
of certainty and predictability, while the latter evades a straightforward account in
terms of rules which can be written down. Attending this is the myth that science
proceeds linearly in its elucidation of propositional knowledge, what the Greek term
episteme describes as the straight path of reason. In reality, science proceeds along
a much more convoluted trajectory, reminiscent of artistic process— the crooked
path of knowledge, metis— tracing the thread of Ariadne weaving its way through
the labyrinth, entailing a series of ﬂuctuations between real and abstract (Latour,
1999).
In analogy with the material traces of performance art, representation can be a
medium onto itself, distinct from the physical realization of the project, with its
the waves of modeling, formalisms, tentative analyses, derivations and sketching,
still constituting an aesthetic realm. There is much in the process itself which can
be elegant or stilted, beautiful or abominable. These are, after all, the tools of the
toolmaker, the means of producing the fabric of modern life, with all of its implica-
tions for labour, ecology, development and atrophy. In my own practice, representa-
⁴As long as reality and representation completely agree, which they never do.
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tion is essential in achieving my aesthetic-functional aims. Such aesthetic goals have
pushed the engineering methodology to extremes, as in art there are few limits to
the imagination. At the same time, thinking representationally can be conﬁning and
unresponsive to what’s going on, right now.
Artists are often comfortable as bricoleurs, and, in this regard, I ﬁnd the greatest
contrast with engineers. Deleuze and Guattari view engineering as the opposite of
bricolage, which instead proceeds from detailed goal-oriented plans and utilizes so-
called raw materials⁵ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). Bricolage is performative making
without intermediary, and while extreme, captures a capacity within most artists.
In spite of the sacred territory bricolage represents, I view its valuing as a fetish,
reminiscent of the classical privileging of speech over writing. Without any inter-
vening structure or representation, we might infer a directness of expression or of
transmission between artist and viewer. But there aremany artists who apply labour-
intensivemaking-from-scratch as well, at times necessitating the use of a well-staffed
art-factory system⁶. Is such artwork less meaningful because of its deliberative na-
ture? I do not see the rigorous and time-consuming methodologies of engineering
per se to be at odds with art practice, but, in my experience, there is something per-
sistent about engineering methodology which, if not entirely offensive, seems to rub
many artists the wrong way. While the utilitarian nature of engineered objects poses
a challenge to their interpretation as art, this is not in itself an insurmountable difﬁ-
culty. Consider, for example, that each of Duchamp’s famous readymades is an object
of function— a bottle rack, an umbrella, a bicycle wheel, a shovel, a urinal. More con-
temporary examples would include the sculptures of Noriyuki Haraguchi (full-scale
replicas), or Iñigo Manglano-Ovalle (objects with a ready-made feel). However, what
⁵Arguably still bricolage but at ﬁner resolution.
⁶Well-known examples of which include the studios of Andy Warhol, Ai Weiwei, and Jeff Koons.
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makes these objects art is their aesthetically-independent conceptual framing with
respect to a given historical context, an intellectual advance requiring the relevant
expertise, i.e., the knowledge and skills of an artist. Moreover, these objects demon-
strate that, in contemporary art, the “readymade” has become not a signiﬁer of mass
manufacturing, but of the handmade, a rejection of the aesthetic nihilism of concep-
tual art.
To think of aesthetics and function as being mutually exclusive is irrational at this
point in history. Conceptual art, pop art, performance art and new media have all
greatly expanded the scope of aesthetic concern. My point here is to suggest that
engineering, with its deliberative representational (and supposed utilitarian) ways,
is not inherently in opposition to art practice, but representational means as well
as utilitarian concerns must be inﬂected in order to produce art. And by integrating
engineering methodology, art practice can expand, developing aesthetic concerns in
regard to function and meeting our increasingly technological age on its own terms.
Aesthetics and function are, at any rate, correlated. Allen has argued that the myriad
uses of an object are implied by its aesthetic qualities (Allen, 2008). The sharpness
of an edge, the sleekness of a proﬁle or the weight in the hand suggest multiple
uses of a thing. Beauty, he continues, is proportional to the degree to which the
user’s experience has been anticipated in the work. A bridge may be robust, but if
its appearance betrays its stability, the design has failed obviously from an aesthetic
standpoint but also in terms of its function, which includes the experience of safe
crossing. From this idea of “functionless functionality” Allen blurs the line between
function and aesthetics, showing that how an object looks, feels or sounds and how
it works are inexorably linked.
Of course, as means, engineering methods can furnish the artist with options in
terms of production. This collaborativemodel or “technology in the service of art” is a
25
valid entry point for engineering into the artworld, but is much like the arrangement
between architect and civil engineer. I am much more interested in how an art prac-
tice emerges from an engineer’s reﬂexive participation in their own project. What are
the precedents which could anchor the prosaic activities of technology development
within the art canon? What could the engineer do differently to fashion artworks
rather than infrastructural works? Consider, ﬁrst of all, that without a comprehen-
sive set of aesthetic concerns, contemporary technological production is a machine
of advancement, driven by the force of economic expansion, producing systemswith
ever-increasing potency and the potential for irreversible change (Franklin, 2004; Har-
away, 1991). As a way of thinking, art necessitates a formidable aesthetic sensitivity,
and, if emulated within engineering, offers the possibility for technology making
that is mindful, democratic and ecologically sound (Balsamo, 2011). In addition, as
art becomes increasingly about doing and functioning both within and without the
white cube, the development of a medium of function may be worthwhile. With its
concern for function, engineering can offer art not just material means, but a way of
conceiving of projects.
processes
In September 2012, I was taking the ﬁrst studio class of my life taught by Professors
Johanna Househoulder and Ian Carr-Harris, at OCAD University. I recall, during my
ﬁrst individual session with the professors, asking “what do I do?” because, except
for various grade-school projects, I had never previously intentionally made a work
of visual art. Johanna suggested that I begin with discourse, a word which I had—
in my liberal-arts-starved engineering existence— not heard used often. But I took
it to mean reading. Ian added that, as an engineer, I already had a way of making
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things, and that producing art should ﬂow from this ability intuitively. My main
concern was that engineering took a lot of time and resources. How could I create
an engineered work in just two weeks (which was the time frame allotted for each
major project in the class)?
In spite of the initial feelings of overwhelm, I began as Prof. Householder recom-
mended. I read, attended shows and talks, and watched lectures on-line by critics
and art historians. I journaled and did quite a bit of thinking. I was trying to grapple
with what an artwork means. Although I have always found art fascinating and have
enjoyed gallery visits, I had only an inkling of how art could connect with broader
issues; it seemed to me that art only related to itself, that it was a closed world, a
feeling that some of my reading tended to corroborate (Thornton, 2008).
But I had several important realizations while reading some of our assigned mate-
rial (Kwon, 2004; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). I started to understand how art was now
(for the past hundred years) more about ideas than objects or media, and as a result,
its ability to interface with any domain was virtually limitless. Also, the critical re-
sponsiveness which was embodied by artworks was exactly what I had felt had been
lacking in engineering practice. I felt liberated because engineering could, through
art, be about its very circumstances— the ecological destruction in which it was im-
plicated, the unbridled capitalism driving it, the mindless consumerism bingeing on
it, the knowledge workers exploited in the process— in a kind of parallel with insti-
tutional critique and performance art. This was a result of what I would later be able
to later identify as reﬂexive methodology, assessing how technological production in
its current manifestation facilitates the labour conditions and cultural tendencies
which sustain it (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000).
Around this time I discovered systems art, and was quite taken by Hans Haacke’s
Condensation Cube (1965-2008)— simultaneously an aesthetic object and one that
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worked, responding to its external conditions— feedback! Imagine, artwork inspired
by cybernetics, one of the branches of engineering in which I specialize!⁷ At least it
was a start. With the cubes of Haacke and minimalist artists freshly in my mind, I
came up with the location for a site-speciﬁc work— my ﬁrst art project since high
school— which seemed appropriate for its familiarity: an engineer’s cubicle. Site-
speciﬁc but not ﬁxed to any precise location, the work had a nomadic sense to it, an
impermanence suggesting a kind of potential, which appealed to me. I didn’t want
to make art that was entirely cynical, even though it was largely disillusionment
with the engineering profession and academic world that made art school seem ap-
pealing. But I wanted to make something that worked, a contraption of some kind
and thoughts of oppressive ofﬁce environments brought to mind executive toys, like
Newton’s Cradle. An excerpt from my process journal, dated October 2012:
... this is a site-speciﬁc work, and the site I’ve chosen— the technology work-
ers’ cubicle— [is] an interesting site because of its indifference to actual
physical location... it could be anywhere... but like more contemporary site-
speciﬁc work, we know that “site” has become more about context than co-
ordinates, about what you can’t see but can experience... playing off of the
idea of an “executive toy”
To engage the cybernetic/systems-theory tools which were such a strong part of
my engineering practice, I came up with the idea of a feedback-controlled gantry
which, in principle, could be manipulated by viewers, allowing them to strike a row
of pendula almost at will, except for the perceptible intervention of a control system.
Reﬂecting on the use of control system technology, I wrote (also October 2012):
there is no “full manual” mode because technology (represented here by the
embedded control/intelligence) is ever-present; there is no way to shut it off
anymore, and (like Ursula Franklin [says]) it’s not just the gadgets and ma-
chinery, our culture and our institutions are shaped by technology’s inﬂu-
ence, the values that promote industrialization (things like efﬁciency, repro-
⁷Enthusiasmdamped only slightly bymy subsequent reading of the The CyborgManifesto (Haraway,
1991)
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Figure 3.0.1: Screenshots of i-Balls (2012).
ducibility, performance, cost) seep into our way of life, in the things people
“like” and “dislike”
In part because of time constraints, the ﬁnal implementation was a physics-based
animation, rendered using the engineering computer-aided design software known
as Matlab®, screenshots of which are shown in Fig. 3.0.1. I had also completed a
substantial amount of conceptual sketches and derivations which, as a result of the
parameters of the project, were, especially in Ian’s view, another creative dimension
of the work, see Fig. 3.0.2.
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Figure 3.0.2: A sample of the development work (concepts, derivations) I did for i-Balls
(2012).
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Admittedly, I wasn’t sure if this work was a game, a machine or a strange form
of mathematically rigorous illustration. Some thematic aspects which emerged and
would repeat themselves in much of the other work I was to do included technical
mediation— especially in how cybernetics intervenes between a user and a task—
and networks— how distinct areas of human activity are related within technologi-
cal collectives. I had a desire to probe the systems constituting the fabric of societies,
a tendency which made discourses like speculative realism appealing (Bogost, 2012).
I was drawn to a way of interrogating works that seemed scientiﬁc, and I think, too,
this inﬂuenced how I would like to engage a viewer, in a fundamental sort of meta-
physical questioning. Also evident in this work is labour; the cubicle not only frames
it but also foregrounds it. I later reprised the cubicle in physical form for the subse-
quent group exhibition, Perspectives: Part I in April 2013, Fig. 3.0.3.
Following the ﬁrst semester of the MFA program, I wanted to hone my aesthetic
sensibilities. I had been creating works which looked like “engineered systems,” and,
while this seemed to be a good direction, I had stumbled upon on it somewhat by
default. I wanted there to be a stronger rationalization for my aesthetic choices. I
was already getting looser with my illustrations, using comic-like depictions to in-
spire further machine production, as shown in Fig. 3.0.4. How could I also break out
of my minimalist machine-making tendencies? While I searched for an improved
machine aesthetic, I found that many contemporary conceptual artists seemed to be
moving sympathetically, toward spare or “commonplace” aesthetics. The problem, I
suppose, is that because I am an engineer, utilitarian is not ironic for me. It is, rather,
a way of life. Conceptual art with its readymades, quasi-readymades and bricolage,
was perfectly at ease with things looking utilitarian. Exhibitions around this time
at the Art Gallery of Ontario by contemporary artists like Janet Cardiff, Georges Bu-
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Figure 3.0.3: A physical object, cubicle (2013), made from construction lumber, ply-
wood, mouldings, grey carpeting, latex paint, and various fasteners (original plans).
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Figure 3.0.4: Conceptual drawing in planning phase of i-Ching (2012).
res Miller, Michael Snow and Ai Weiwei, seemed to embody aesthetic restraint, as
if form had been subordinated to materiality, plurality or ideology. I thought that
perhaps, because of my background, that I needed my work to be more aesthetically
embellished. I experimented with a variety of forms (see Fig. 3.0.5), working at one
point with random bits found in craft and surplus stores, supplementing made-from-
scratch works with off-the-shelf pieces.
This aesthetic issue developed into a kind of existential crisis, and I began to ques-
tionwhether I was being authentic. Furthermore, I was not happywithmymore aes-
thetic creations, some of which (shockingly) had no moving parts. They felt strange.
Perhaps, I was not yet ready for a total departure from the utilitarian. At this time, I
found re-reading Barry Allen’s ideas conﬂating form and function quite helpful (Allen,
2008). How an object looks and feels is how it works. One could not hope for a better
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Figure 3.0.5: Some examples of my aesthetic experimentation phase.
34
rationalization for a particular form. There are no aesthetic embellishments, but aes-
thetic features which relate to an object’s ways of working. Even non-load-bearing
features of bridges (e.g., towers, cladding) serve a perceptual function:
A bridge that is merely stable is like food that merely nourishes. Neither
makes us want to come back. Neither gives us anything to live for. What’s
missing? Isn’t it simply the good taste of art? (Allen, 2008, p. 144)
which may seem like circular reasoning, as if Allen is saying that aesthetic properties
of objects serve aesthetic functions. But Allen is referring to the experience of the
bridge, in its totality, demanding of the designer nothing short of empathy toward
users. Part of the experience of the bridge is the feeling of safety, especially if crossed
regularly by commuters, and inspiration (rather than roller-coaster levels of exhila-
ration) in what the collective is capable of producing. The tricky part is to avoid
thinking in dichotomous terms or to privilege function (form) over form (function).
If anything, I surmised, this concern would likely enhance the “diffractivity” of the
investigation.
zeroing in
Looking over the body of art work I have produced in the past couple of years, it is
evident that machinery and process are recurring aspects for me. They are realms in
which I’m looking for answers and, in this regard, feel like the right places to be for
making art. I could not have foreseen this. I needed to experience it, to allow the
practice to unfold, and I think art has to be this way. Art is a synthesis that happens
largely at a level below conscious awareness. The same can be said for engineering
when operating in an inventive mode.
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Coming through the aesthetic struggle, I realized that I did not have to try to make
engineered systems look like artworks. Rather, because my work is engineered to be
art, it simply is art, by deﬁnition. There is the separate question: how does one know
that one is making art? but this is an issue for every artist, not just one attempt-
ing to apply engineering techniques. As far as interdisciplinarity is concerned, this
epiphany felt both profound and anti-climactic. There really aren’t two disciplines.
But there are. Rather than getting stuck in this paradox, I resolved to do what artists




A machine has to be constructed, and art as abstract machine will require
an artist adequate to the task: a mechanic.
— Stephen Zepke (2005, Introduction)
Reality is fully appreciated only by taking into account its intricate dynamism and
performativity. In the face of this unavoidable complexity, how do we make our
lives embedded in such collectives? Systems engineering and cybernetics are not
just about war machines and societal controls, but developing an understanding of
how systems grow, decay and oscillate, the effects of network topology on system
function, as well as the instrumental roles of feedback and nonlinearity in producing
complex behaviour. Cybernetics offers a means by which we gain an understand-
ing of dynamic interactions, discovering how actor-networks work. It is, for me, a
medium through which I construct machines with metaphorical value. As far as the
viewer is concerned, insights from the function and material traces of these works
can, for example, suggest how we might be implicated in the causes of the circum-
stances in which we ﬁnd ourselves, for, as Haraway notes, the cyborg is not innocent.
Playing with such notions and inviting users into this world is part of my creative
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impulse. But is it art? In my practice, the questioning is more a matter of how than
why— I want the viewer to invent solutions, or, at least, attempt to do so.
Asking why in technological collectives can lead us to short answers: we seek in-
stant gratiﬁcation or we do not plan ahead. After all, the leverage modern technology
provides is considerable and increases seemingly without end. But it is through a
complex web of interactions and feedback that the collective trauma of our imme-
diate decision-making becomes apparent, so I do not see the question as why, but
rather, how does this occur? This is a probing into the metaphysics of parallel chains
of cause and effect, a speculative consideration of what is the nature of our action,
and what our actions mean. This is not necessarily science ﬁction, but it has the air
of science to it, as in a kind of thought experiment. As life in the matrix becomes
increasingly complicated, we need an expanding literacy to survive it, perhaps par-
tially achieved by introducing engineering into the art gallery, and, correspondingly,
artistic ways of thinking into technological production.
Blending art and engineering can imply an inversion of aesthetic paradigm, in
which what is ordinarily immaterial becomes central. My art practice is based on the
foregrounding of technical labour— one means by which the network is revealed—
through various material traces including sketches, derivations, mathematical ma-
nipulations, simulations and physical experiments. These elements constitute ex-
pressions of advanced engineering; simultaneously aesthetic objects onto themselves
but also esoteric meanderings. Connecting this work to the ﬁnished products— un-
deractuated balancing mimetic robots— suggests the impact of such technics, felt
globally as a transformation into handheld lifestyle compounded by mounting piles
of “well-made garbage” (Allen, 2008). Because how things are made now matters cru-
cially, process art as well as performance art of immaterial labour capture our situa-
tion as never before (Jones, 2014). The current emphasis on making is a Renaissance-
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like movement, a lost tradition within the western canon ﬁnding relevance since (in
what is ironic for me) the advent of industrialization.
In this thesis the machine functions as both artwork and metaphor. It is also a
break in the ﬂow of knowledge workers, who themselves are machines within a sys-
tem of technological production which generates a ﬂow of machines. The viewer
is engaged in both process and function— within the artwork, the viewer is placed
in the ﬂow of technological production, to experience it and also, hopefully, to in-
terrupt it. Whether or not technology’s course is “good” or “bad,” it powerfully inﬂu-
ences culture and demandsmindful consideration. Canwe bemindful of technology
without examining it? Technological growth is driven by a kind of delirium, for the
expansion is not, for ecological considerations alone, rational. What then, is the
nature of technological production as a machine, why and how does it operate?
The broad designation of newmedia art (NMA) which encompasses any artwork in-
corporating mechatronic or computing elements of any kind, problematizes a schol-
arly assessment of how a given work should situate itself amongst prior contribu-
tions in the mainstream art world (Shanken, 2009). More recently, however, robotic
art is appearing with increasing frequency in major public galleries; as George Bu-
res Miller has noted in a private chat with me “[high technology] is like the printing
press,” becoming commonplace and merely in the service of art. In historical terms,
the collaborations between Klüver and artists like Warhol and Rauschenberg are the
ﬁrst examples of technological facilitation of an art project. However, arguably the
abrupt end of the short-lived EAT was brought about by a failure to synthesize the
negative ramiﬁcations of science and technology in the midst of the Vietnam War¹.
¹Which is not to imply that EAT was not reﬂexive in regards to science and technology; indeed,
the primary mandate of EAT was to conﬂate art and technology, to show that risk and uncertainty are
as endemic to the hard sciences and engineering as they are to the visual arts (Kuo, 2011). However, in
my opinion, EAT did not go far enough— viewers could still see science and technology as panacea—
during a time of technology-enabled war.
39
The present work is no doubt technological and therefore may be cast within NMA.
But more precisely it exists within a category of art which employs robotics as well
as themes of industrial production and globalization, which is to say that technol-
ogy is used reﬂexively rather than solely in the service of the aesthetic experience.
Moreover the thesis works have a de-aestheticized character, i.e., each machine is de-
veloped sans façade as an “engineered work.” The mimetic quality of the works in
combination with motion also suggest a “performance by proxy,” akin to a form of
“second-order” performance art, a contemporary niche exempliﬁed in the works by
artists (to name a few): Lois Andison, Doug Back, Chris Burden, Janet Cardiff, Max
Dean, Ken Feingold, Simone Jones, Laura Kikauka, George Bures Miller, Ken Rinaldo,
David Rokeby and Norman White.
The material aspects of this art practice include the feedback-regulated underac-
tuated machines themselves as well as thematerial traces of their developments em-
bodied in sketches, writings, mathematical derivations and simulation results. The
development process is of central concern in the thesis and is viewed as a performa-
tive dimension of thework. What elevates themaking ofmachines itself to the status
of art (apart from the aesthetic quality of the traces themselves) is ﬁrstly the use of rel-
atively uncommon methods of making vis-á-vis the contemporary art canon which
are currently implicated in an oppressive global materials economy, and secondly




The venue selected for the exhibition was the industREALarts room, located at 688
Richmond St. in downtown Toronto². With brick walls, concrete ﬂooring and barred
windows, the space is evocative of a knowledge-worker sweatshop or a small factory
(see Fig.4.1.1), a setting appropriate to the foregrounding of process and labour.
The workbench, used extensively in the staging of the thesis exhibition, can be
a site of sacred making, a repository of memory, or an instrument of subjugation.
An art-historical precedent can be found in the oeuvre of contemporary artist Vic-
tor Grippo, who has employed the simple worktable to create installations, which
suggest a lifetime of creation and experience haunted by adversity. The layout of
the planned installation is shown in Fig.4.1.2, in which a labyrinthine conﬁguration
alludes to both Latour’s writings on the “reality of science studies” as well as the
ancient Greek mythological genius, Daedalus, whose fantastic machinations were
both beneﬁts and hazards to his patrons (Latour, 1999). The Minotaur and labyrinth
are products of Daedalus’s inventiveness, and the viewer is given the opportunity to
navigate the crooked path of reason, should they dare.
The workbenches themselves are CNC cut and laser etched, then worked and as-
sembled by hand. Each bench (minus an additional top) is made from a single 18-mm
thick Baltic Birch plywood panel, measuring 4 ft. by 8 ft. (cutting diagram shown in
Fig.4.1.3). Part workbench, part plinth, these objects retain a utilitarian appearance
while conceding something to the gallery aesthetic (top, front and side views shown
in Fig.4.1.4).
²Since the time of this writing, the thesis exhibition venue has been changed, however, the new
setting shares many of the aesthetic qualities of the originally selected venue.
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Figure 4.1.2: Floorplan of auto-lysis thesis exhibition. Workbenches are shown as num-
bered and are drawn to scale with respect to the ﬂoorplan (also to scale). Floorplan of
the industREALarts Room courtesy Kirk Austensen and Cathy Mancuso.
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Figure 4.1.3: CNC cutting diagram for workbench design (by author). For scale refer-































centred 0.156” diameter holes (#6 screws), countersunk, threaded if possible
6.0” light bar
Figure 4.1.4: Top, front and side views of assembled workbench.
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The actual work in developing the machines spanned a number of activities, in-
cluding sketching, simulating, deriving, designing, prototyping and journaling. To
capture the layering of work, moving between “real” and “representational” modes,
and to suggest the diffractive use of methodologies (“seeing through one another”), I
developed a series of palimpsest-like designs, each covering the entire work surface,
which also serve to “transmute the equations”³. Layers of the palimpsest are dis-
tinguished with lighter or darker shades of grey, corresponding to lower and higher
intensities of laser beam, framed by an iPad border hinting at the tool used to facili-
tate much of my creative thinking (and reinforcing a connection with technological
production and labour). The laser beam embodies another layer of mediation, etch-
ing the palimpsest images (two of which are shown in Figs. 4.1.5 and 4.1.6) largely
from hand-drawn work.
4.2 mimetic robots
The design and realization of underactuated machines is proposed as a methodolog-
ical basis for my interdisciplinary art practice. A machine⁴ is underactuated if it pos-
sesses more degrees of freedom (joints) than controls (actuators). Therefore, such
a machine cannot be directly manipulated into a particular state or conﬁguration⁵.
While servo-driven robots tend to move robotically, with every motion determined
explicitly by active means, underactuated systems capture the passive characteristics
of animal locomotion and movement and therefore display a more mimetic quality
³As suggested by Prof. Dot Tuer during my ﬁrst year at OCAD University.
⁴We deﬁne a machine as an assembly of rigid elements interconnected by joints which can be
rotational (revolute) or linear (prismatic); each joint can represent more than one degree of freedom
(DoF), and each degree of freedom corresponds to one conﬁguration variable of the system.
⁵Unlike, for example, a “fully actuated” robotic arm possessing a motor at every joint which can be
made immune to the effects of gravity and other known external forces.
46
Figure 4.1.5: Laser-etched palimpsest design for workbench # 1, 30 in. by 22 in.
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Figure 4.1.6: Laser-etched palimpsest design for workbench # 2, 30 in. by 22 in.
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of behaviour. The signiﬁcant challenge, however, is to elicit desired behaviours from
an underactuated system. This requires a coordination of parts since we cannot uni-
laterally dictate the operation of each joint. There must be a blending of wills, the
attainment of a moment-by-moment consensus of system and control. Such coordi-
nation is routinely performed by the human brain and nervous system for walking,
which precisely coordinate muscle ﬁrings based on the vestibular sense, propriocep-
tion, etc., in order to achieve the stabilized bipedal gait.
To synthesize such a coordination requires both an understanding of the machine
as a network of dynamically interacting elements and the use of feedback principles.
Feedback control is the means by which systems— both animal and machine— au-
toregulate, and is widely employed in contemporary technologies⁶. Feedback con-
trol is an extreme form of technical mediation, not merely facilitating an activity as
a passive implement functioning according to the user’s will or as an exteriorization
of the user’s memory, but as a decision-making tool, a technology which supplants
the user’s judgment, issuing commands and taking actions on behalf of the user.
The art-machines developed in the thesis are Elle Eg and El Bo, shown in Figs. 4.2.1
and 4.2.2, respectively. The ﬁrstmachine features a completely passive two-DoF ankle
and semi-passive knee (stabilized via elastic cords) alongwith a two-DoF actuated hip.
The machine attempts to remain balanced through hip movements alone, moving
its upper link (torso) about two orthogonal rotational axes, according to a controller
algorithm develop using system theory. The second machine has a passive one-DoF
⁶Common examples would include temperature control (using thermostats), cruise control, anti-
lock braking systems, traction control systems (sometimes referred to as “nanny mode”), auto-pilots
and economic control via prime-lending-rate adjustment. The body contains many control systems
which use a combination of electrical signals and hormones to regulate a wide range of autonomic
functions; for example, the cardiovascular system adapts heart and breathing rate to demand and
insulin controls the uptake of glucose to regulate blood sugar level.
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Figure 4.2.1: Art-machine Elle Eg, concepts sketches and photographs (2014).
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Figure 4.2.2: Art-machine El Bo, concepts sketches, solid model (STL image ﬁle) and
photograph (2014).
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elbow, and attempts to stabilize its arm in the upright position through shoulder
movement. El Bo also features a fully articulated passive hand, as shown in Fig. 4.2.2,
which can be threaded with nylon cord to allow grasping.
The underactuated property of a machine parallels the nature of complex and dy-
namic real-life networks. Whether a single actuator amongst many joints and links
is able to effect change throughout the system is a matter of agency. Agency in such
a network does not come straightforwardly through sheer force, but through special
action. Latour states, “... action should rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a con-
glomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly disentangled.”
In a similar fashion, in an underactuated system an action (in the sense of Latour)
can be understood as a circuitous propagation of causes-and-effects which lead to
a net result. Therefore, while the art-machines of this work are of comparatively
low order by the standards of real-world networks in their “full realness” they are in
themselves apparatuses of agency, providing a means of experimenting with what




So technical people, objects, or skills are at once inferior (since the main task
will eventually be resumed), indispensable (since the goal is unreachable
without them), and, in a way, capricious, mysterious and uncertain (since
they depend on some highly specialized and sketchily circumscribed knack).
— Bruno Latour (1999, p. 190)
As a thesis conducted within a ﬁne arts educational institution but employing en-
gineering methodology— a self-imposed constraint— a fundamental question reads
as follows: within the artworld context, does engineering have anything to say? The sci-
entiﬁc apparatus, as a platform of investigation, shares much in common with the
work of art. As with conceptual or process art, the apparatus performs, engaging the
viewer in an enactment, inviting the viewer to (re)consider “something we took for
granted” (Monk, 2002). Like the experimental platform, art provides uswith a focused
context and the means to investigate, to discover new relationships amongst the fa-
miliar. As with the “synoptic tableau” of science, we can hypothesize and correlate
our experience of the work with our thinking to arrive at new realizations (Latour,
1999).
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The art-machines of this thesis employ technical mediation in the form of feed-
back control to coordinate motion, but the net motion comes from multiple agen-
cies, including those of the humans who presumably designed the machine for a
particular function, who organized its architecture and programmed its controller
to operate in a particular manner. The machines and installation become an appa-
ratus to consider the myriad possibilities by which the network is conﬁgured in the
technological collective. How are the various human actants, from those who could
have served as referents (possibly hundreds of years ago) to those who pieced to-
gether these creations, be implicated in the ensuing upheavals, within the network
and beyond? How does the presence of various non-human mediators affect the
network, dynamically shaping the ontologies of all actants? What do we become?
The questioning is important but the answers are unknowable— the topology is not
known, the parameters are not known— so the system evades prediction. The idea
that we can’t possibly know the outcome is good to know. Moreover, stimulating our
speculative muscle is not only engaging, but necessary for informed agency within
the collective. And I think that’s all I could hope for in regards to my artwork.
The coupling between humans and technology is a dynamic one, which, in our
times of rapid technological change, is persistently in a condition of non-equilibrium.
That is, the circumstances are not static, and are likely subject to time constants on
the order of a human lifespan, making a characterization of the dynamic coupling
empirically difﬁcult. What canwe expect, then, in the long-term (or to invoke dynam-
ical systems parlance: asymptotic) sense? My work can offer a coming to terms with
our inexorable technological constitution, not a seeking of escape to an idealized
nature somehow devoid of technology or a shedding of organicity for some purely
mechanized existence, but a consideration of the myriad possibilities by which we
might live as cyborgs.
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5.1 future work
Whether or not the artworks produced in this thesis are considered successful, I
know that I have beneﬁtted tremendously in the attempt. There have been no more
intellectually stimulating spans of my life than the past two and a half years spent
as a graduate student at OCAD University. Above all, art serves no one. It is the freest
domain of human expression. Like design—what I had thought I would be studying
at OCAD U.— art observes. But unlike design, in which the application frames the
observation, in art, the artist alone determines the parameters of their investigation.
I can think of no other discipline so unfettered. Most of us are habituated to think
within certain limits, even discouraged from thinking “too creatively,” and I won-
der if our collective condition is not the result of a kind of insanity— ﬁxed in our
thinking but expecting transformation. And I understand the need to keep things in
check, why, for example, professions have regulatory bodies to ensure established
procedures are adhered to in the interests of public safety. On the other hand, I have
also experienced on too many occasions great obstacles to the creative impulse, in
situations where new ways of thinking should be embraced. So I would like, some-
how, for this interdisciplinary experiment to continue, to be reiterated by other in-
dividuals. I think more engineers need to experience what I have experienced. As
much as I would like to believe that I have made progress in the hybridizing of art
and engineering, I think the best result from my thesis is to have demonstrated that
an engineer who receives training in ﬁne art can experience a worthwhile transfor-
mation, even if the change comprises nothing more than a heightened capacity to
empathize, the mustering of sufﬁcient courage to take occasional chances outside
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